Conservative Politics as an Occupation

The 6th post on the Journal of American Greatness originally published in February, 2016.


This journal expects little from Paul Krugman, whose writings seldom offer more than a predictable mash of remedial textbook Keynesianism and strident campus partisanship.  However, credit must be given where credit is due, and Mr. Krugman’s latest broadside against the Republican punditocracy, “Twilight of the Apparatchiks,” hits most of its marks.  Indeed, we regret not having written it first.

Perceptively explaining the conservative commentariat’s  fecklessness in the face of Trump, Krugman writes:

So what’s the source of this obliviousness? The answer, I’d suggest, is that in recent years — and, in fact, for the past couple of decades — becoming a conservative activist has actually been a low-risk, comfortable career choice. Most Republican officeholders hold safe seats, which they can count on keeping if they are sufficiently orthodox. Moreover, if they should stumble, they can fall back on “wingnut welfare,” the array of positions at right-wing media organizations, think tanks and so on that are always there for loyal spear carriers.

And loyalty is almost the only thing that matters. Does an economist at a right-wing think tank have a remarkable record of embarrassing mistakes? Does a pundit have an almost surreal history of bad calls? No matter, as long as they hew to the orthodox line.

Whatever one’s disagreements with Krugman, none of this can be denied.  In truth, the reality is much worse (and let us for the moment leave aside the extent to which this reality also prevails on the left).  The degeneration of conservative ideas is not simply a matter of partisan enthusiasms overwhelming detached scholarship, as Krugman implies.  It is not because of misplaced zeal that the party has come to rely on blind loyalty to old orthodoxy.  Quite the contrary.  The party insists on loyalty to orthodoxy because it has no new ideas.  And it has no new ideas because its intellectual leadership has allowed conservative thinking to ossify into little more than repeating the slogans of the 1980s and wondering why they don’t work anymore.  Of course the carried interest loophole is vital to economic health!  Of course free trade is beneficial always and everywhere!  Of course holding elections in Iraq and Egypt and Syria will transform those societies!  The calendars in conservative think tanks ended in 1983, or maybe 2003.

Why is this so?  Again, Krugman is mostly right.  Becoming a conservative intellectual in good standing today is all about finding a sinecure at the right donor-funded institution and writing for the right money-losing magazine.  Attend the right summer fellowship programs and get the right NRO internship and you, too, can become an up-and-coming conservative blogger!  And once established as a conservative luminary, you can be assured that the conservative media will never criticize the actual results of your work or proposals, as long as you obey the unwritten rule that the system must never be criticized.  Questioning the conservative intellectual consensus is costly; simply being wrong has no price.  It is the conservative equivalent of university tenure, and the system’s beneficiaries fight with equal relentlessness to preserve their prerogatives.  However admirable the origins of many conservative institutions, the result today is essentially a madrassah system in which scholars are judged on how perfectly they can recite the holy text, not on whether they can improve upon it.

We can hardly blame conservative intellectuals for seeking to propagate their doctrines.  But we do blame them for making ideological consistency the main criterion of excellence.  We blame them for confusing fealty to institutions designed to offer apologias for their donors with intellectual courage and leadership.  We blame them for finding truth in adherence to dogma rather than achieved results, quality in comfortable conformity rather than depth of experience or thought.  Ronald Reagan’s life experience was not limited to attending the right seminars nor, for that matter, was Irving Kristol’s.  And if it were, most probably neither would have amounted to much of anything.

Like many elite institutions, orthodox conservatism has become its own mandarin class, and as such it is no surprise that it fails to produce any effective political or intellectual leadership.  It has no capacity for self-examination or critique.  It has no basis outside–and it is incapable of drawing ideas from anywhere beyond–the established think tank programs, where one former low-ranking Bush appointee imparts the immutable creed to the next generation of already sympathetic “young leaders.”  The actual experience of a policy’s author, or the practical results of its implementation, rarely seem to be considered.  The system is designed to create a professoriate and a priesthood, not a president; a book club rather than a government.  The result is an intellectual leadership as obscurantist as the Lebanese Druze, without any of their political agility.

The “seriousness” of every Republican candidate is judged by how many of the old think tank hacks they have on staff as advisors, regardless of how many failures those same advisors may have been responsible for in the previous administration.  Any candidate suggesting the slightest deviation from the old Reaganite platform will be denounced as an irresponsible heretic.  Any candidate who promises a third term of the Bush administration will inevitably be praised for “innovative policy proposals.”

Of the formerly “greatest field ever” of Republican presidential candidates, one glaring deficiency characterized the whole establishment-approved lot: Neither Marco Rubio nor Ted Cruz nor Scott Walker nor any of the others (except Paul, Carson, and Trump; Bush’s career as a showpiece for Lehman does not count) had any significant life experience outside of politics.  Is it any wonder, then, that they could not conceive of a political campaign outside the straight-jacketed conventions of the conservative cocoon?  That they could curry favor with pundits and donors, but no one else?

Yet the politicians, at least, have to win elections to hold their offices.  The former frontrunners of the media-think tank complex never gracefully suspend their campaigns.  Why anyone ever considered Bob Kagan and Max Boot credible foreign policy strategists in the first place defies belief, neither of them having ever accomplished anything greater than speechwriting and punditry.  But that anyone continues to publish their nonsensical drivel–now so thoroughly discredited by an uninterrupted series of failures over the last two decades–is an insult to reason.  And yet, all the king’s horses and all the king’s men of conservative media foist them upon their readers again and again.  Why?  So they can express how outraged–nay, appalled!–they are by the voters who reject them?  Where is the National Review special issue which denounces these clueless blowhards and Clinton supporters?

Thus it is that most conservative institutions today are intellectually bankrupt.  They have been for decades.  Most of the movement’s leading talkers are a defunct clerisy.  And it is this class which Trump now threatens most.  He has already exposed them and their whitepaper filigrees as hopelessly irrelevant–if not repellent–to a wide swath of the party, and a Trump victory would shatter all the precious china of conservative “thought” completely.

Admittedly, we wish that National Review would have purged the failed doctrines of the Bush administration and their oblivious authors from its pages rather than waiting for Trump to marginalize National Review.  And we would prefer that the destroyer of institutional conservatism had a firmer grasp of policy and a better understanding of the theoretical currents in American history.  But at this point it is clear that a plurality of the party, at least, would prefer even the shallowest Trumpism to the profound failure of Bush era conservative doctrine and its gatekeepers.  Frankly, we find it hard to disagree with them.

The Bush presidency discredited the movement’s ideas.  The Romney campaign proved it could no longer win on a national level.  And, win or lose, Donald Trump has proven that its self-proclaimed intellectual elite no longer motivates its own party.  For even the “non-Trump” candidates have discovered that they can only win by running against Trump’s personal flaws, rather than for the desiccated husk of Bush era ideology.

In a healthy political movement, such events might be cause for serious reflection and a rethinking of its doctrines, of whether its policy platform is the right one for the country and its constituents.  But we do not have a healthy movement, so the debate is over whether a particular candidate or policy is authentically “conservative” or appropriately “Reaganite,” but never whether it is right.  Is this really all there is to conservative thought?

If so, those who continue to affiliate with the movement will soon find themselves holding their debates in the basement rooms of used bookstores, wielding as much political influence as the pre-Bernie Sanders Trotskyites.  Trump’s many shortcomings notwithstanding, clearing the dead wood of such a hopeless elite is the most compelling rationale for his campaign.

—PLAUTUS

Will You Be Taking the Whole Family?

The 5th post on the Journal of American Greatness originally published in February, 2016.


So Bob Kagan, the Edith Wilson of the neocons, is voting for Hillary.  Because of Trump.  Who isn’t even yet the Republican nominee, but Kagan is already leaving the party in a huff.  Is anyone surprised?  He auditioned for a job in her coming administration almost two years ago.  The whole trend-line of Kagan’s career, and of neo-conservatism generally, all points in this direction.  Whatever on earth was “conservative” about messianic, utopian foreign adventuring in the first place?
Kagan can’t stomach Trump.  Trump probably hasn’t heard of Kagan, but were they to cross paths, the feeling would no doubt be mutual. Kagan’s leap has the potential to be a great boon to the Republican Party, and a great millstone for the Democrats.  We hate to be greedy at the prospect of such good news, but we would ask one more thing: please make sure to take the whole family!  Actually, we’d be happy to keep Donald, but if filial ties win the day, we understand.
—Decius

Last Conservative Worth Reading?

The 4th post on the Journal of American Greatness originally published in February, 2016.


Jonathan V. Last is one of the few conservative pundits worth reading.  Before you think “That’s like saying Sporty was the best Spice Girl,” please realize I didn’t mean it as an insult, though of course it’s only natural to interpret it that way.  But Last really is quite good.
Here he says many sensible—and hard to refute—things about Trump.  But he doesn’t stop there.  He goes on to try to equate Trumpism with Trump and to dismiss the arguments of those (such as the authors of this blog) who may be uneasy with Trump himself but find much of value in Trumpism.

Last:
[T]he sophisticated view of Trump and Trumpism has gone something like this: Donald Trump may be a huckster, but he has done a service to the Republican party by bringing new, nontraditional voters into the tent. He has shown his fellow candidates that they can flatly reject the demands of political correctness and need not drop into turtle-guard whenever the New York Times takes a shot at them. And while Trump the man is not presidential material, Trumpism — that is, the collection of populist and nationalist concerns that have become wrapped up in the man’s campaign — is potentially very helpful. Over the last 16 years, the Republican party has been largely ineffectual, both in power and in opposition. It has been hostage to a donor class that is almost completely at odds with Republican voters.
Trumpism, in other words, looked like a political movement that could — and possibly even should — be incorporated into the GOP.
There is some truth to much of this.
Did you really need both qualifiers, Mr. Last?
In any event, I would say the same of Last’s account of the case for Trumpism: there is some truth to much of it, but he leaves out a great deal.  It’s not incidental to state forthrightly what Trump’s “populist and nationalist concerns” actually are—secure borders, economic nationalism, and interests-based foreign policy—because they form the core of Trump’s appeal.  It would be clarifying to know what Last thinks of all those individually and in toto.
Last goes on to chastise Trump for embracing the far-left “Bush lied” meme.  Fair enough, Trump has it coming.   He then goes still further to excoriate those who support Trump anyway.
[I]f one can’t be against illegal immigration and the donor class, yet also think that conspiracy theorists ought not be suffered in high office — then [the price of Trumpism] is too high.
Is Last against illegal immigration and the donor class?  I’d like to think so, since I admire his writings and think he’s smart, but he doesn’t say either way.  And of course those two positions alone do not exhaust Trumpism.  What does he think about the rest?
As to the substance of Last’s complaint, he didn’t ask us what we thought of what Trump said about Bush.  But we’ll answer anyway.
It was a dumb thing to say.  Trump probably doesn’t really believe it, which would be bad enough, and if he does believe it, that would be worse.  A more sensible way to have registered his opposition would have been to have said “Even if they believed it, how can anyone doubt at this point that the war was a mistake?  No WMD were found, so the threat was at best greatly exaggerated.  Democracy did not take root, so the secondary rationale was also a failure.  And we ended up losing thousands of American lives to destabilize a country and a region, without making our own country any more secure.  Part of statesmanship is learning from mistakes.  It’s obvious many others in both parties have learned nothing from the foreign policy disasters of the last 15 years, but I have, and things will be different in my administration.”
However, if Last’s point is to goad us into repudiating Trumpism, no thanks.  We’d still prefer a candidate who says something dumb about the beginnings of a bad war that’s mercifully over to one who says sensible things about that old war, but hair-raising things about all the new wars he intends to start once he’s elected president.  And that’s before we get to immigration, trade, and all the other ways that Trump—and Trumpism—are superior to their rivals.
Last ends with an uncharacteristically dumb statement of his own:
Trumpism has been revealed not as a path forward for a party desperately in need of reform, but a zombie virus that is making fools of the people who embrace it.
No.  Trumpism—to repeat, secure borders, economic nationalism, and interests-based foreign policy—is precisely the path forward for a partydesperately in need of reform.  Or, if it successfully resists the treatment, it will be the basis for a new party, after Trump and Trumpism mercifully euthanize the old.
—Decius

Council on Foreign Relations Embraces Trumpian Trade Policy

The 3rd post on the Journal of American Greatness originally published in February, 2016.


Writing in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris echo Trump in lamenting the “lost art of economic statecraft,” which, they correctly point out, was once standard American policy.  They write:

For the country’s first 200 years, U.S. policymakers regularly employed economic means to achieve strategic interests.  But somewhere along the way, the United States began to tell itself a different story about geoeconomics.  Around the time of the Vietnam War, and on through the later stages of the Cold War, policymakers began to see economics as a realm with an authority and logic all its own, no longer subjugated to state power….International economic policymaking emerged as the near-exclusive province of economists and like-minded policymakers….

At the very time that economic statecraft has become a lost art in the United States, U.S. adversaries are embracing it.  China, Russia, and other countries now routinely look to geoeconomics as a means of first resort, often to undermine U.S. power and influence….

In a rare point of agreement between them, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson shared a basic enthusiasm for economic tools of foreign policy.  Hamilton, the father of American capitalism, stressed the value of commerce as a weapon, a proposition that few trade policy-makers would agree with today….

The Journal of American Greatness applauds this worthy contribution to the formulation of a Trumpian policy and commends Foreign Affairs for its broadminded discussion of Trumpism.
Could it be that Trump’s questioning of AEI’s ostrich-like policy dogma actually has serious policy merit?  Could it be that the only clownish candidates are those still repeating their freshman year economics lecture on Ricardo?
Like the Psalmist’s watchman, we wait in vain for the supposedly conservative press to embrace a trade policy actually grounded in American interests rather than simplistic textbook formulas.  But that, after all, is why the Journal of American Greatness exists.

— Plautus

The Twilight of Jeb!

Originally published as the second post on the Journal of American Greatness in February, 2016.


Arising from the collapse of the Bush campaign comes an unmistakable if somewhat disturbing sense of pleasure.  This pleasure goes beyond the schadenfreude of the hard right at the humiliation of a “RINO.”  It is palpable throughout the party and beyond, and it is evident across the spectrum of media coverage.  Even the candidate himself, by all accounts a decent man, seems relieved that his ordeal is over and that he can move on to all the “cool things” a life outside politics has to offer.

No such glee was felt at the exit of Scott Walker, who was for a time considered a similarly strong candidate.  And no such excitement will greet the departure of others as the field narrows.  This striking fact that no one is mourning—and everyone is celebrating—the defeat of Jeb Bush demonstrates that his campaign actually did have a certain significance, although certainly not the significance intended.

Students of campaign history will find peculiar parallels between the 2016 primary and that of 1996, which was delightfully chronicled by Michael Lewis under the Trumpian title Losers.  Lewis at the time was especially drawn to Morry Taylor, an iconoclastic businessman whose principal argument was that a political class composed of idiots too incompetent to succeed in business was driving the country to ruin.  Taylor’s campaign, of course, appealed to few besides Lewis in 1996—the world was younger then.

However, if Taylor was Lewis’ hero, his most pathetic character was Lamar Alexander, whose banners read Lamar! and whose expensive, pre-packaged and ultimately hollow campaign perfectly presaged Jeb! 2016.  It is not coincidental that the destitution of both candidacies was revealed from the start by the false familiarity and artificial exclamation points.  Lamar! was the brainchild of Mike Murphy, current manager of Bush’s superpac.  Lewis quotes Morry Taylor describing Murphy, his former neighbor turned consultant, as “a fat little kid from next door who didn’t know anything you don’t know and who is now making hundreds of thousands of dollars telling Lamar Alexander what you think.”

Within this Trumpian character sketch is precisely what motivates the electorate’s euphoria at the unraveling of Jeb! 2016: everyone can see that the so-called elite is really quite stupid!  And they are losers!

Bush is losing not because his policies are too moderate or even because he is supported by the “establishment.”  He is losing because he believes in the establishment.  Everything he says and everything he does reveals him to be the devotee of an elite that is thoroughly discredited to everyone except itself.  And the elite, in creating, funding and advising Jeb! 2016, revealed how deserving of discredit it is.

Who but a paid political consultant could be so politically tone-deaf as to believe that attacking Rubio’s missed Senate votes would be a popular issue?  Yet Bush, apparently unable to think outside the narrow circles of beltway conventional wisdom, deployed this line and effectively ended his already flailing campaign.  He exposed his own lack of judgment in listening to such advice, and, more significantly, the intellectual bankruptcy of his highly paid, supposedly elite, advisors.  This exposure of an elite wholly bereft of quality underlies the exhilaration experienced at the end of the Bush campaign—the only joyful thing to come out of Jeb! 2016.

Pundits with nothing better to write about complain, as they always do, that this election has favored sharp sound soundbites over substantive policy.  But what constitutes substantive policy?  What innovative or even interesting ideas did the Bush campaign propose?  After months of campaigning, he could not articulate a coherent view on immigration, education, Iraq, or even fantasy football.  Bush, like any candidate, was called substantive only insofar as his positions comported with the views of the political, financial, and intellectual elite.

And the critical difference between 1996 and 2016 is that Morry Taylor’s message has found an audience.  Indeed, insofar as a candidate is seen to personally endorse the elite consensus (which is distinct from simply being endorsed by the elite), that candidate will struggle to inspire any broader constituency.  This might say something about today’s elections or today’s electorate, but it certainly says something about today’s political elite.  Ben Bernanke can call people know-nothings, but what, exactly, in Ben Bernanke’s record should merit unquestioning confidence?  Is it really so absurd that a meaningful segment of the public would prefer candidates offering little beyond opposition to Davoisie conventional wisdom over the vacuous “substance” and mindless conformity of the elite consensus?

Quoting Lewis again:

For the last four years Lamar has been raising money by telling people he is the only Republican in America who can beat Bill Clinton.  He talks endlessly about his ‘vision.’  He squints as he does this; he sees it; the trouble is, no one else does….his pitch is that he is not someone else—he’s not Washington, he’s not a negative advertiser, above all he’s not Clinton.  But of course he is Washington, he is negative, and, above all, he is Clinton….To which segment of the American population does this appeal?…Alexander [only] attracts people who use niceness to get what they want.

The same phenomenon is present as well on the Democratic side.  Hillary may attain the nomination for lack of an opponent, but the obvious absence of enthusiasm for her candidacy is the result not only of endless scandal but also the inescapable sense that she represents and is personally invested in an elite status quo which commands no respect.

It is difficult to ignore the Weberian aspects of the present election.  The Clintons, of course, have always embodied the late Weberian political types—specialists without spirit and voluptuaries without heart—but this time the feeling is not confined to them alone.  The gulf between charisma and expertise has widened conspicuously since 1996, and the impression that electoral popularity now seems inversely proportionate to political experience cannot but disquiet.

It is tempting to see a return to an earlier and in many ways more vibrant condition of American politics—what Weber called “government by dilettantes,” in which voters prefer “having people in office whom we can spit upon, rather than a caste of officials who spit upon us.”  Indeed, after the experience of the last twenty years, in which the elite consensus has been wrong about seemingly every issue of any consequence, it is impossible to avoid the definitive Clintonian question: What difference, at this point, does it make?

— Plautus

Notes on the Origins and Future of Trumpism

Originally published as the first post on the Journal of American Greatness in February, 2016.


It may seem absurd to speak of Trumpism when Trump himself does not speak of Trumpism.  Indeed, Trump’s surprising popularity is perhaps most surprising insofar as it appears to have been attained in the absence of anything approximating a Trumpian intellectual persuasion or conventionally partisan organization.  Yet, Trump’s unique charisma notwithstanding, it is simply impossible for a candidate to have motivated such a passionate following for so long by dint of sheer personality or media antics alone.

Whatever might be said of the media’s treatment of Trump, it has been remarkable in at least one respect: Michael Brendan Dougherty of The Week, along with Rush Limbaugh, actually uncovered the closest thing to what could be described as the source of Trumpian thought in the writings of Sam Francis.  This discovery is most importantly a rediscovery of themes quite prevalent in both academic and political discourse not many decades ago, specifically a critique of the managerial economy and global bureaucratic elite.  Despite their conspicuous absence from political discussion in recent years, these ideas, especially in Francis’ writing, not only clarify the significance of Trump’s popularity but provide the best explanation and justification for the broader disaffection underlying politics today.

The briefest perusal of Francis’ work will attest to the fact that he was the most talented member of the faction that has come to be called the paleoconservatives.  The article most referenced with respect to Trump is “From Household to Nation,” which is a recapitulation of Francis’ efforts to define Pat Buchanan’s presidential campaign in opposition to multicultural leftism, global capitalism, and liberal/neoconservative interventionism on the basis of a particularist American nationalism.  It also contains many delicious lines about the worthlessness of Republican campaign consultants, institutions, and other movement apparatchiks and hangers-on.  In short, “From Household to Nation” strikes today’s reader as a remarkable prophecy of the Trump campaign’s popularity, specifically in its apparent disdain for the old conservative movement and in its message of an American nationalism that does not fit conveniently into either party’s platform.

“From Household to Nation” adequately summarizes the implications of Francis’ oeuvre, but the core of his thought was articulated in a series ofessays for Chronicles Magazine from 1989-1991.  These works were later overshadowed by his more topical, outwardly provocative—though less intellectually radical—and, in some cases at least, deservedly criticized statements on race.  Undeniable lapses in judgment and decency notwithstanding, however, the mere fact that the Southern Poverty Law Center lists Francis as a hate peddling extremist alongside the likes of AEI’s Charles Murray(!) ought not to preclude a careful study of his thought.  In his early work especially, Francis develops a perceptive political theory, admittedly inspired by James Burnham but elaborated with greater cogency and liveliness, that deserves attention in its own right but even more so if Trumpism is poised to have a role in electoral politics.

Contrary to his association with paleoconservatism, Francis’ writing makes no meaningful appeals to traditionalism per se nor does it contain anything even remotely predicated on historicist or Burkean overtures.  He goes so far as to assert that the old political categories of right and left, conservative and liberal, are no longer meaningful.  His is a fundamentally revolutionary doctrine, and the target of this revolution is the global “managerial class” or post New Deal bureaucratic government and corporatist professional elite.  This managerial class, increasingly separated from any national body or interest, from any historical community, metaphysics, or morality, is inevitably impelled by its internal logic to seek the destruction of any intermediating institutions, ultimately and especially the family, the homogenization, de-legitimization, and eradication of culture, and the levelling, regimentation, and dehumanizing of all society.  Francis’ neo-Marxist universe is governed by class and power, with the managerial class allying with proletarians of every kind in order to seize power and reduce the remaining independent citizenry to a global, dependent, thoughtless, and spiritless underclass over which it dominates.

Francis, of course, was neither the first nor the only writer to develop such ideas.  His unique contributions lie more in diagnosing the difficulties of challenging the managerial elite, of which more below, and the precision with which he situates contemporary politics in such a theoretical framework.  For Francis, the true animating spirit of any “conservative” political action is not lower taxes, lighter regulation, banning abortion or even constitutionalism strictly speaking.  These causes are at best symptoms of and at worst a sort of false consciousness obscuring the defining struggle of resistance against the managerial class and its depredations.  The true task is the destruction of the soulless managerial class, a task inseparable from the assertion of a healthier culture and a stronger elite in its place.

While Francis’ doctrine is not in itself wholly original, it has, along with its predecessors, been curiously forgotten today, in both politics and academia, rendering its inchoate expression through the vehicle of Trump new and exhilarating.  This forgetfulness, moreover, is responsible for the all too apparent incomprehension of the “establishment” at the popularity of Trump and his campaign.

For there is no doubt that Cruz, Rubio, and most of the other candidates are more ideologically conservative than Trump in their policy prescriptions, longstanding affiliation with the party and the movement, and broader theoretical orientations.  Everyone knows this.  But Trump’s popularity has nothing to do with conservatism of this kind or conservatism strictly speaking at all.  It has everything to do with opposition to the managerial elite, the world it has created, and the world it is ruthlessly destroying.  The true test in this election is not whether a candidate checks various boxes on issues or voted for the right legislation.  It is not whether a candidate supports amnesty or not, eminent domain, abortion, or even political correctness.  These are at most metonymies signaling one’s stand on the fundamental question: opposition to the global managerial elite.

Thus the much touted establishment versus non-establishment divide is delineated by one’s perceived commitment to the opposition against the managerial class and not the stringency of any particular policy proposals.  And there is simply no question that however fastidiously Cruz, Rubio, et al. may worship at the altar of “conservative” policy, every aspect of their careers as well as campaigns indicates that they are thoroughgoing products and proponents of the rules of the managerial system.  Both Trump’s career and campaign, in contrast, probably out of sheer Caesarist egotism, have been marked by rebellion against this elite and its culture.  He has opportunistically exploited various aspects of the system, to be sure, but at every point he has revealed his utter if often vulgar contempt for it.

Herein lies the primary, if typically unconscious, motivation behind Trumpism and the essence of its appeal.  It also explains the failure of attacks on Trump to resonate with his supporters.  Criticizing his campaign for its lack of “seriousness” is especially counterproductive.  To Trump’s supporters, combating the ceaseless quest of the managerial elite to control and destroy their way of life is deadly serious, far more important than any wonkish debate over specific policy.  Even aside from the fact that the “serious” policy now being offered, such as “forming an Arab coalition to fight ISIS,” is almost always patently ridiculous, the primary question for voters is of ends and not of means.

Similarly, appeals to principles such as limited government ring hollow without a deeper understanding of the cultural transformations behind our political transformation.  Another new tax plan does not herald a return to classical limited government in any meaningful way, and appointing some nicer people to the bureaucracy will not in itself bring us any closer to the republicanism of 1789 or even 1989.  The venerable principles of the Founding, however admirable, are empty if not accompanied by a serious challenge to the current elite and culture.

From a different perspective, some have interpreted Trump’s rise as the capture of the “Reformicon” agenda in the imperfect though flashier vessel of Trumpism.  This interpretation ignores, however, the “Franciscan” radicalism underlying Trump’s appeal.  The Reformicon proposals—a child tax credit here, an earned income tax credit there—smack of attempts to ameliorate the destructive impact of the managerial economy rather than replace it.  If Reform Conservatism is to achieve the impassioned popularity of Trumpism, it will have to represent something more than managerialism with a human face.

Trump’s core message—tariffs, immigration restriction, limiting tax inversions—offers a radical departure from the policies and partisan divides of the last several decades and is intuitively linked with the dismantling of the global managerial economy.  What is perhaps most curious at the policy level is how few and feeble have been the attempts to actually attack these basic pillars of his message.  For all the complaints about the lack of substance in the campaign, no other candidate has honestly or effectively attacked the central substance of Trump’s platform—though many from both parties have claimed to agree with it—and those few attacks have occurred exclusively at the level of rote ideology or political correctness, which stands as perhaps the clearest evidence of how thoroughly the alternatives have been discredited.

Nevertheless, the slight but not entirely inconsequential overlap between Reform Convervatism and Trumpism reveals a rather surprising element of Francis’ thought.  Namely, despite all the hostility between so-called paleocons and neocons, the essentials of their doctrines, at least in their highest articulations, are remarkably convergent.  At risk of offending all involved and no doubt inviting criticism from both sides, to someone with no history in the intramural rightwing squabbles of the 1980s, the disputes appear to center more on regional and personal animosities rather than actual ideas.

The critique of the managerial economy and the ambivalence toward global capitalism at the center of Francis’ work were equally the focus of early neoconservative writings, nor did their conclusions, to this reader, differ in any meaningful respect.  And while Francis overtly indulges various Southern nostalgias, some more thoughtful than others, it cannot be forgotten that among the more memorable writings of Norman Podhoretz and Daniel Patrick Moynihan were direct discussions on race, as politically incorrect as they were intellectually honest.  Both sides brought a renewed attention to culture, alarmed at its evisceration by both global capitalism and the multicultural left as well as the difficulty of effective political action without concomitant cultural power.  Even on foreign policy, as both Ted Cruz and Benjamin Netanyahu have had occasion to remind audiences, the first generation of neoconservatives, at least, expressed a profound skepticism of internationalist abstractions such as human rights, while understanding that foreign policy was much more than simply economic policy.

Francis shares with the most thoughtful neoconservatives an idiosyncratic appreciation of founding myths, in which the reader finds perhaps the most significant philosophical divergence between them amid striking similarity.  Francis writes:

Post-Hamiltonian American nationalism offered no public myth of the nation, and the ultimate price of its failure to do so was the collapse (and subsequent redefinition) of the nation in the Civil War.  Only when Lincoln invested American nationality with a quasi-religious mythology was nationalism politically and popularly successful.  But Lincoln’s nationalist myth, drawn from a universalist natural rights egalitarianism, justified national unity only as an instrument of “equality of opportunity” and the acquisitive individualism that follows from it.  Lincoln’s nationalism soon degenerated into the wolfish egotism of the Gilded Age and the naked imperialism of McKinley and Roosevelt, and ultimately its universalist, egalitarian, and individualist premises contradicted and helped undermine the particularity that a successful nationalism must assert and the subordination of individual ambition that nationalism demands.  If a new nationalism is to flourish and endure, it must do more than offer a merely narrow, pragmatic, and largely economic definition of the national identity and the national interest.”

At issue is primarily Francis’ objection to the Lincolnian vision of a “creedal” nation, distinct only in its dedication to a proposition, in favor of a sort of ‘constitutionalism in one country’ more reliant on the unique history and culture of its people.  And, indeed, there is unfortunately no doubt that however thoughtful the neoconservative re-elevation of Lincoln may have begun, the doctrine degenerated over the decades into an empty sloganeering that in the mouth of George W. Bush not only failed to motivate but gave rise to all manner of Wilsonian fantasies.

The important question raised by this dispute, however, is not who was right fifty years ago or refighting the Civil War or Iraq, but rather what the failure to resolve this question implies.

The simple fact is that both sides know that the other contains some truth.  On the one hand, however admirable the Lincolnian creed might be, many nations today espouse—some quite genuinely—more or less the same principles.  Yet while the U.S. is and ought to be a friend and ally of the U.K, Poland, France, and, yes, Mexico, Israel and others, there is no question that an authentic American nationalism must remain distinct from French nationalism.  Even at the height of Bush era democracy promotion, no one sincerely conflated American nationalism with mere democracy, though that was often the implication of Bush’s rhetoric and policy, which only reinforced the power of global managerialism.  On the other hand, as Francis himself readily acknowledges, a nation utterly bereft of principle will possess no nationalism above arid antiquarianism or inspire loyalties beyond a geographically organized gang of thieves.

Thus the great failure of the American right has been the failure to define an American nationalism at once grounded in binding, necessarily particularist, traditions and institutions while at the same time leavened by a creed worthy of the name.  And this failure is inseparable from the right’s failure, even in periods of electoral power, to offer any effective resistance to the ever conquering globalist managerial class or attain any effective cultural significance.

Trump’s success, then, is attributable in large part to his awakening in his followers an appreciation for such a nationalism of American greatness opposed to the managerial elite, even if they do not yet know what the content of that nationalism is.  Trump’s avoidance of policy specifics belies a more fundamental avoidance of any direct confrontation with either particularism or creedal principle.  If Trump or a new nationalism is to be genuinely successful, however, it will eventually have to take a stand on these questions and ultimately resolve them.

Perhaps Francis’ greatest contribution to political writing is his understanding that the difficulty of formulating such a nationalism is necessarily connected with the difficulty inherent in resisting the managerial class.  Drawing on Machiavelli, Francis recognizes that the “Middle Americans” who constitute the last remaining opposition to the managerial elite represent a class that only seeks not to be ruled, whereas the managerial class seeks to rule.  As such, the “Middle American” resistance to managerialism has expressed itself as either a defensive crouch or an unappealing bunker mentality, neither capable of resisting, much less replacing, the managerial elite.  The political project of supreme importance is therefore the transformation of passive Middle Americans into a new ruling elite, while the ideological project of supreme significance is the formulation of a new nationalism which will justify that political project.

For the last several decades, however, the right has operated under a further debilitating false consciousness in defining itself as a conservative movement.  The reality is that the modern right, in both its self-styled neoconservative and paleoconservative strands, is not conservative in any meaningful sense of the word.  It merely inherited the mantle, language, and intellectual framework of the old conservatism, a constellation of institutions and attitudes dominant from the Civil War to World War I.  But after the New Deal and World War II, this order had been decisively shattered and replaced by managerialism, to the point where there was nothing left to conserve.

The purposes and principles of the modern right are necessarily revolutionary.  This is true as a historical fact inasmuch as its leading thinkers have been Catholic, Jewish, ethnic, and in all essential respects outsiders from cultural and political power.  And it is ideologically true insofar as its chief intellectual and political project is the replacement of the global managerial class with a new elite.  The failure of the right’s thinkers and politicians to recognize or admit its revolutionary aspect, even and perhaps especially today, only impedes effective political action.

The Republican party “establishment” finds itself continually disappointing its base because it is incapable of conceiving of itself as the revolutionary movement it must become.  And it will continue to disappoint even if Republican politicians become more successful at winning legislative victories.  Overturning Obamacare will mean nothing if it is not part of a larger dismantling of the managerial elite.  Counting up state governorships will achieve nothing if it does not produce a transformation of elite culture.  And a transformation of the current culture is impossible without a convincing nationalism to challenge it.

Indeed, the situation would be entirely hopeless were it not for the fact that the managerial elite has lost all confidence in itself.  As it continues its withdrawal from all attachments to living communities, interests, or faiths, it loses any ability to justify itself, even to its own members.   Without a coherent understanding of its purpose, it ossifies into a rigid mandarin class, distinguished by increasingly meaningless credentials, and blindly dedicated to stale dogmas that it can no longer even discuss.  Ever more adrift with respect to its ends, it becomes increasingly incompetent with respect to means.

The abject vapidity of both the Clinton and Bush campaigns testifies to the elite’s degeneration.  Floundering between poll-tested positions to focus-grouped slogans contrived by consultants as detached from the people as their decrepit dynasties, they inspire hardly anyone but the next generation of job seekers.   Their campaigns exist to offer little more than citations of inequality data or GDP growth, as if national or individual greatness were matters of arithmetic.  More generally, the basic policies of both parties have hardly changed in at least thirty years, the desiccated outgrowths of sterile foundations.

Meanwhile, what is the recent wave of college protests but a futile grasping for meaning amid a sea of intellectual and moral bankruptcy?  What is the super-rich’s fixation with the much publicized “giving pledge,” itself untethered to any specific principle or purpose—never mind mawkish publicity stunts like Mark Zuckerberg’s—but an implicit admission that everything else they have done is worthless.  Cecil Rhodes was many things, but never so pathetic.

While current economic conditions are not particularly robust, the country has endured far worse.  Although facing a number of security threats, the nation has survived situations far more perilous.  Is the widespread disaffection roiling both parties merely the result of Americans being “fearful” of external threats?  Or is it the increasing realization among the public that its elites not only have no idea what they are doing, but no longer even believe in themselves?  That the managerial class’s soulless destruction of human attachments has been undertaken for nothing more than its own mindless self-replication?

One of Marx’s most clarifying statements was his observation that the Mexicans lost California because they did not know what to do with it.  They may yet get it back, for the same reason.  But this principle also operates on a broader plane.  Those presently occupying the commanding heights of culture, the economy, and politics clearly have no idea what to do with them.

For the right, the question is, do we?

— Plautus