Guest Post from the Future by Thomas L. Friedman

The 80th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in May, 2016.


[Editors’ note: we can’t help but notice that conventional wisdom on certain Trumpian topics seems to be shifting of late, however slowly.  The following draft of a 2018 Tom Friedman column (yes, he writes his columns several years in advance–are you really surprised?) was recently made available to JAG by a dissident within the New York Times editorial board.  Reprinted in its entirety. — Plautus

The American Spring: Why Donald Trump’s America First Strategy Is Really a Twofer

by Thomas L. Friedman

The first rule of holes is, when you’re in one, stop digging.  When you’re in three, you need a lot more than a bunch of shovels—you need a bulldozer.  That’s what Donald Trump gets that others don’t.  Donald Trump has taken a bulldozer to our policy graveyard.

So how did we get here?

Three years ago I shared a cab in Dar es Salaam with a young entrepreneur named Goodluck.  Goodluck owned a growing manufacturing business.  He told me that just a few years earlier, he was a cafeteria worker for a giant Chinese conglomerate, making a few shillings a day.  He never would have dreamed of starting his own business, because it would have been impossible to compete with a glut of cheap imports.  Thanks to new trade policies designed to favor local businesses, however, he now runs three plants and is building a fourth, employing hundreds of Tanzanian workers.

I could not help thinking to myself, why can’t this happen in America?

 

We all know the answers: political gridlock between parties more concerned with ideological litmus tests than working together; a wasteful and chaotic foreign policy chewing up resources and dividing the country; a detached intellectual elite whose loopy globalist fantasies obscure real solutions to problems here at home.  Too many politicians; not enough dealmakers.

Back in New York, I happened to be having lunch with my old friend Corey Lewandowski.  We started talking about what might be done to make America great again.  I told him about my experience in Tanzania.  Then I picked up a napkin and drew a line across it.  “Do you know what that is, Corey?” I said.  “It’s a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.”

Yes, it really is that simple.

Fast forward to the present.  I just landed at the new airport in Pittsburgh, rebuilt under President Trump’s infrastructure plan, and am about to meet an old friend, Morry ‘theGrizz’ Taylor.  Morry ran for president in 1996 and now is the CEO of a major wheel manufacturing company.  He is one of a new breed of innovative CEOs like GE’s Jeff Immelt.  Both are returning to their industrial roots to grow their companies here in the USA.

Morry tells me business has never been better.  Now that we’ve straightened out our trade policies, he says, profits are way up.  He’s hired hundreds of workers and relocated supply chains closer to home.  As Larry Summers has written recently, productivity, wages and consumer spending are also on the upswing.  Just as I predicted in that lunch two years ago, Trump’s America First Strategy is a win-win-win for the domestic economy.

But then Morry’s tone changes.  “What do you think of Mike Bloomberg’s new Technocrat party and their free trade platform?” he asks me, “I’m concerned they might pick up seats in the midterms.”

“Morry,” I told him, “I don’t think about it.  You know what, sir?  I wrote a column opposing it, and I don’t even know what’s in it.  I just heard two words: ‘free trade,’ and I know that whoever says that doesn’t know what they’re talking about.”

Frankly, it’s embarrassing that, in 2018, we still have a major political party in this country that is running on the Manchester Liberalism of the 1800s.  America needs a responsible opposition party.  But the demagoguery of zealots like Mike Bloomberg is not governing liberalism.  It may work with the downwardly mobile, low-information voters in the DC suburbs, but out here in Pittsburgh, people see it for what it is: irresponsible scaremongering.

Morry is also excited about our improved relationships with foreign powers and the newly independent Kurdistan.  I agree.  Since the United states started basing its foreign policy on concrete national interests, we’re safer at home and more respected abroad.  Like I told my friend Michael Mandelbaum, professor of foreign policy at SAIS, the undirected foreign adventurism of the Bush and Obama administrations wasn’t win-win-win.  It was lose-lose-lose.  He calls it mission failure.  I call it failure to even have a mission.

But those days are over.  President Trump understands that we need to use hard power, soft power, and smart power.  It’s what I like to call very smart power.  It’s a Geo-Red-White-and-Blue policy for the 21st century.

That’s what people in the sunny uplands of a renewed middle America understand that too often escapes the inside-the-box crowd trapped in the cramped conference rooms of Davos.  Putting America first is really a twofer.

Globalism may have been a larger than usual blip on the news cycle radar screen, but today it belongs in the recycle bin of history.  Tomorrow belongs to the nation-state.

 

David Brooks is off today.

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Leverage v. “Should” Diplomacy

The 79th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in May, 2016.


An old joke about American foreign policy mandarins holds that every S/P memo offers three alternatives: all-out nuclear attack, preemptive surrender, or the continuation of present policies. We were reminded of that by the consistent criticism that Trump is out of touchout of his depthall wrong—about China.  The only way forward in our relations with China is to keep doing exactly what we’re now doing.  There is no other way!  And why need there be, since it’s all working out for the best?  And even if it weren’t, there’s nothing we could do.

Of course, it’s not all working out for the best.  Only a blinkered (blinky?) ideologue could deny that at this point.

But that’s not the important part of the above formula.  More interesting is the implicit fait-accomplism.  Is it really true that there’s nothing we can do?

We’ve criticized before the typical American approach to diplomacy over the past 25 years or so, in which our side tells some other side that it “should” or even “must” do this or that.  It’s in your interest!  You need to be a stakeholder in the international system!  If you do this, everybody wins—you most of all!

No country has heard this tired speech more than China.  Its officials have endured it so many times they could recite it drunk.  I sometimes imagine Chinse diplomats blowing off steam after a long day at the MoFA, hitting a Sanlitun bar, knocking back a few and seeing who can best capture the cadence of Deputy Assistant Secretary Worthington C. Ebbinghausen as he reaches the peroration of the American “You Should” speech.  It must at the very least be difficult to keep to keep a straight face in actual meetings when Mr. Ebbinghausen begins his wind-up once more.

The bigger joke, of course, is our relentless naivety.  It must sound incredibly funny to hear us tell them what their interests are.  Like the leaders of any country, the ChiComs are pretty sure that they have a better idea of their own interests than we (or any foreigners) do.  They also have the good sense to pursue those interests through policy, negotiation and much else.  The fact that we don’t behave similarly with regard to our interests must strike them as insane—if also as an instance of their great good fortune.

Let’s hope that in a Trump Administration, Foggy Bottom, USTR, the NSC, and the rest of the sclerotic foreign policy bureaucracy will tear up that speech, forever bury “Should” Diplomacy, and send Mr. Ebbinghausen packing to CSIS.

The touchpoint of any foreign policy negotiation with an adversary is leverage.  To be effective, rather than exhorting the other side about what they should do, we need to explain what we wantthem to do—and then bluntly tell them what we are going to do if they don’t.  If you don’t have leverage, the whole point of the conservation is moot.  The discussion itself is worse than useless.

Does America have leverage over China?  Of course we do!  Two yuuuuge leverage points: we owe them a lot of money, and their economy is utterly dependent on access to our market.

I can hear the wise and good yelp as I type.  What are you suggesting?  That we default?  Destroy our credit and currency?  Start a trade war?  (Any suggested deviation from the Davos-quo is always denounced as the opening salvo in a “trade war.”)

Not exactly.  You know the old saw: if you owe the bank $100,000, you have a problem; if you owe the bank $100 million, the bank has a problem.  We owe China something above $1 trillion.  That’s a big problem—for them.

We’re far from being experts on Chinese industrial espionage and intellectual property theft.  But we do know that they are also big problems—for us.  There would seem to be a potential connection, no?  If you lent $100 to someone who then stole $50 from you, would you pay him back the full $100?  Maybe, if you’re a chump—which, as Trump points out, the last thee administrations at least have been.

Oh, sure, our officials acknowledge that it’s a problem.  They put it on the agenda at various summits, ministerials, bilats, trilats, multilats and other international fora.  The Chinese listen silently—and then do nothing, confident that everything will go on as before.  Because it always has. Because our side believes it has no leverage—at least none that it is willing to use—and that any deviation from the present course will bring on Armageddon.

Here’s an idea.  Get together some of the best intellectual property experts in the world.  Canvas industry and government for their stories.  Hire the best accountants you can find.  Commission the mother of all studies.  Put together a report longer than the ObamaCare law.

Then, at the next meeting with the ChiComs—when they’re sweetening their French Roasts in order to stay awake through yet another “You Should” speech, which they’re sure is coming—drop the report on the table with a loud thud.  And then surprise them with this speech:

Great to see you.

Here’s the executive summary of this report.  Over the last 37 years, you’ve stolen from us $750 billion in intellectual property [numbers made up for now, of course].  It’s all detailed in the report.  If you want to see the underlying analytics, we’ll upload them to a file locker of your choosing.  It’s 25 terabytes.  Yes, you’ve stolen that much—that we can account for.  We promise no viruses—we really want you to read this.

Our view is that all this theft amounts to in-kind contributions that cancel our debt on a dollar-for-dollar basis.  We’re happy to leave it at that—that is, in terms of what’s past.

Going forward, we obviously cannot continue to allow what’s taken place to continue.  Further such espionage will be met not merely with further debt cancellations, but also with tariffs, up to and including restrictions and even closures to given markets.  Our preference would be to restrict such closures to sectors directly related to those you target.  We try to be fair.  But we can’t promise anything.

If you’d like to talk about any of this—maybe make some gestures of goodwill to show us that you’ve gotten the message—we’re open to that.  Go ahead with your gestures—we’re happy to wait and see.  But not for long.  Say, sixty days.  Then the cancellations—which is to say, stopping service payments on debt that these figures show we’ve already paid in full—will begin.  And you can forget about a return of principal on maturity.

If you want to borrow further from us, that would be fine—just know that going forward, the same calculation will apply in perpetuity.  Whatever you get away with stealing, we count that as repayment.  Otherwise, we fully understand if you’d like to park your sovereign wealth somewhere else.  That could be tricky, given that we’re the only safe haven not currently charging negative interest.  But that’s really none of our business, and good luck to you.

Of course this can’t be done.  It just … can’t’!  Deputy Secretary Ebbinghausen is appalled at the mere suggestion!  Everyone would dump US debt.  Treasuries would be worthless.  The dollar would be finished as a reserve currency.  And so on.

Certainly there is risk in such a course.  But as to threats to our currency’s status, so long as our analysis is credible and rigorous, we can make the case to other borrowers that this move doesn’t apply to them.  Unless they too are thieves.

Ah, but sovereign debt is fungible.  What’s to stop the Chinese from dumping Treasuries?  Well, nothing—except that’s just another way for them not to get paid back.  Once we make the policy known (should it come to that; the threat might be the beginning of a fruitful new phase of our relationship and could be kept private), we can make it known to everyone else that, so long as they hold our debt, interest payments will be honored.  That would effectively freeze Treasury trading for a time, reducing its value as a liquid asset.  But the effect would be temporary—and worth it.

The alternative is to give in to the Ebbinghausens and fatalistically do nothing.  Or, rather, to consider “action” to be endless ineffectual complaints about Chinese stealing.  How’s that been working out for us?

This new approach might not work.  It might have unintended consequences.  But we’re going broke as it is.  We owe a quasi-hostile power more than 5% of our GDP—all the while, that power steals from us with impunity.  To refer once again back to JAG’s immortal motto: What difference, at this point, does it make?

—Decius

A Litmus Test for “New People”

The 76th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in April, 2016.


As noted, our favorite part of Trump’s recent speech was his sensible call for “new people” to run American foreign policy.  Here’s a simple test to identify new people suitable to serve in the national security bureaucracy in a post Clinton-Bush-Obama world—new people to entrust with putting the pieces back together after what Conrad Black has called “decades of shabby and incompetent government.”

Were you against the Iraq War, but for the Surge, and against Obama’s 2011 bug-out?  That’s it.  Anyone who checks all three boxesshould be on the short list for the top jobs.

Against the Iraq War: we’re not as hard over on this point as some would like us to be.  We think there were defensible reasons to be for the war—in 2002-3.  It was not an easy call to make at the time, despite what some others insist.

However, no later than the Spring of 2004, it should have been painfully obvious to everyone that the invasion was a mistake.  Hence those who opposed it initially were right and those of us who supported it were wrong.  Since, as Thucydides taught us so long ago, the supreme quality of the statesman is foresight (pronoia; πρόνοια), the judgement of those whose foresaw the calamity and urged against it should be preferred to those who did not foresee it, or who indeed denied it.  This is just elementary common sense.

More controversial will be our position on the Surge.  Most Iraq War opponents (and, we venture to speculate, many current Trump supporters) similarly opposed the Surge—some because they are reflexively anti-war, some out of a misplaced “consistency,” and others because they saw no compelling national interest in it.

The first two reasons hardly require refutation.  As to the third, the reason to support the Surge was not out of any moral obligation to stabilize Iraq after having shattered it—Colin Powell’s so-called “Pottery Barn rule.”  We do not dismiss such moral obligations out of hand.  But rarely do moral considerations take ultimate precedence in issues of war and peace.

For the Surge: the purpose was, first and foremost, to defeat al-Qaida in Iraq, an avowed and dangerous enemy of the United States. As should be obvious by now, despite our confirmed opposition to the neocons, and whatever our sympathies with the alt-right on immigration, trade, and the foreign policy disasters of the last two decades, we do not share the view (admittedly not universal on the alt-right) that the U.S. has no interests in the Muslim world, that terrorism is an overblown neocon boogeyman, that if only we didn’t support Israel Muslims wouldn’t hate us, and so forth.  In short, where and to the extent that the alt-right starts to sound identical to the anti-American left, we part company with them and stand with Trump.

The defeat of al-Qaida in Iraq was a serious boost to American prestige after the debacle of the Iraq occupation to that point, and a serious blow to al-Qaida and Islamist radicalism* in the region and worldwide.  It stopped cold, for the time being, a movement that up to that point had been growing.  It made attacks on American interests overseas and on the American homeland much less likely.

As to the withdrawal: It does not follow from the fact that it would have been better never to have been in Iraq in the first place, that the right policy was to get out as soon as possible, on whatever terms available.  Having stabilized the country, it was in American interests to help it remain stable.  A stable Iraq would have been a bulwark against terror and a continued American presence (not nearly the 170,000 troops at the peak of the surge, but 10-20,000) would have deterred enemies and acted as a rapid response force against other threats in region.

Note that we did not say “a democratic Iraq.”  Here, though, we bump into a problem that anti-democratizers underestimate.  The American people, or a sizeable portion thereof, do not like the United States to openly prop up non-democratic regimes.  We suppose this arises from our own commitment to democracy and perhaps to our success with Germany and Japan after World War II. Whatever the reason, as we’ve seen especially since 1945, a big chunk of American public opinion does not like America to have non-democratic allies, and the more we are involved in another country’s affairs, the less they like it.  Now, we are convinced there was no way—never any way—for the U.S. to democratize Iraq.  The best we could have done is to have nudged Iraq in a less-bad direction, consistent with its own social structures, Islam, and domestic public opinion.  Which would have likely resulted in a more or less authoritarian regime with pluralistic elements that reigned in the worst impulses of such regimes.  That would have been fine with us—and should have been enough for any sane foreign policy establishment.  However, it would also have required an element of hypocrisy: that is, a consistent over-stating of how democratic this new Iraq actually was and an over-selling of America’s effort to make it even more so.  Adults can understand and accept this.  We belabor this point because it is important that said “new people” understand it and are prepared to act accordingly if America ever finds itself in a similar circumstance.  Which, we reiterate, only a stupid establishment would seek.  But sometimes empire results from necessity rather than choice.

Against the bug-out: just as the success of the Surge in defeating al-Qaida in Iraq was a big boost for America and serious loss for our enemies, the bug-out was a huge blow to American prestige and a morale windfall for our enemies.  It led, among other things, directly to the rise of ISIS and to al-Qaida’s successes in controlling territory throughout the Muslim world.

Why does this matter to us?  It is, alas, necessary in these corrupt times to re-explain elementary things.  1) Because we still need Middle Eastern oil and as long as we do, we have a vital national interest in not allowing a hostile power to control the supply or the choke point through which it must be transported.  Yeah, yeah, I know that Saudi Arabia is a quasi-hostile power, but at least these days it’s also one that is glutting the market rather than trying to starve us.  As noted earlier, it’s doing so for hostile reasons, whichthere are ways to combat.  And this is not the place to go into the Saudi role in 9/11 beyond saying that we are not complacent on this point.  At any rate, clearly America has an interest in increasing our (and Canada’s) hydrocarbon production as much as possible.  To the extent that we can accomplish that, perhaps our military role in the Middle East can be commensurately reduced.

But not eliminated, however much we may wish for that outcome.  Which brings us to reason #2.  A lot of Muslims still want to kill us. They want to blow up Manhattan and Washington again.  And much else.  We can change our policies to be less stupid—and we should; we must—but their hatred will not change in response, nor will their efforts slacken.  Of all the stupidities of the alt-right, perhaps the worst (though, again, far from omnipresent) are their apologetics on behalf of Islamic militancy, which arise (certainly in part) from Jew-hatred.  If only we ended our support of Israel, the terror threat would go away!  We don’t doubt that for many radical Muslims, America’s support for Israel is indeed a factor in their hatred.  But … so what?  We could end that support tomorrow and some of that hatred might dissipate.  But would all of it?  Most of it?  Would the most committed give up the fight?  A cursory look at their rhetoric is sufficient to settle the issue.  The question for us should be: Is the US-Israel alliance in America’s national interest? And, yes, that should include the related question: Does it cost us more than it gains us?  But the assertion that They Hate Us Because Israel is a fantasy.

We note, almost as an aside, the glaring contradiction between this—the alt-right’s weakest argument—and what is undoubtedly its strongest.  Mass Third World immigration has been a disaster for the West generally and for the U.S. specifically.  Muslim immigration is the biggest disaster within that broader disaster—a Towering Inferno within the Poseidon Adventure.  The alt-right is dead right about that.  So it’s puzzling and frustrating to read some of those same voices write so insouciantly and admiringly about innocent Muslims lambs and how American-Israeli imperialism has caused all this justified blowback.  Even if every negative thought they ever had about Israel and the Jews were correct, why does that necessarily translate to pro-Islamism?  Is it simply enemy-of-my-enemy short-sightedness?  The alt-right is quick and ruthless (and justified) in ridiculing “conservatives” who make silly concessions to the racialist left hoping they will be given credit for being “not racist!”  Why do some make the same futile gestures toward Islam?  Above all, how do they square their sensible view that mass Third World immigration undermines the West with their Islamophilia?

Yes, we’re aware that liberal Jews are guilty of a similar myopia from the opposite side.  Walls for me but not for thee; immigration is essential for the U.S. but poison for Israel; etc.  This position is, in its own way, just as dumb as the alt-right’s.  Is Muslim immigration to the West really good for the Jews?  It’s a measure of how dire circumstances are that even some of the most clearheaded dissenting voices, at least on the issues that they can see clearly, are utterly foolish on directly-related issues that they misperceive more spectacularly than Mr. Magoo.  In our darker moments, we envision a vast arena, in which the Islamophiliac anti-Semites, the pro-Muslim immigration liberal Jews, and the Muslim radicals who want to slaughter both could all … interact.  Would anyone learn anything?  The Muslims—the fox in this henhouse—would know all they need to know going in.

Delusion seems to be the most prominent common thread running through 2016.  So let’s cut the cord short of further bloodshed. Here’s one way to start.  Appoint to positions of power new people who were against the Iraq invasion, for the Surge, and against the bug-out: the only sensible position on the sad, sorry arc of American involvement in Iraq.  We would also add: people who were against the Libya intervention, against the Arab Spring (or at least honest about its baleful effects, even if there’s not much we could have done to stop it), and against the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt.  Anyone who was wrong on these issues not only has no place in a Trump Administration, but in any administration whatsoever.  Though it appears that many of them will get plum jobs in a second Clinton Administration.  One more reason to reject #NeverTrump.

—Decius

* We don’t here wish to get into the weeds of the proper terminology by which to refer to America’s Islamic enemies.  We’ve read all the arguments: “Islamist” imposes a Western ideological construct those called “Islamists” do not themselves adhere to, “radical Islam” implicitly presumes a moderate Islam which does not exist, and so on.  Call them whatever you want.  We make a fundamental distinction between those who want to kill us and those who don’t, or between those who work to kill us and those who don’t.  We stand by our argument that, whatever the general proportion of each group in broader Muslim population, Islam and the West are incompatible, that it was foolish for the West to allow Muslim immigration (beyond, perhaps, a very small number of highly educated, skilled, secular people), and that Muslim immigration to the West should be halted forthwith.

The Lion and the Lamb

The 75th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in April, 2016.


Harry Jaffa enjoyed repeating that, like Tom Sawyer, he “never attended any religious services except under the sternest compulsion.” But every once in a while, Aunt Polly managed to drag Tom to church.  On one such occasion, Tom

was really interested for a little while. The minister made a grand and moving picture of the assembling together of the world’s hosts at the millennium when the lion and the lamb should lie down together and a little child should lead them. But the pathos, the lesson, the moral of the great spectacle were lost upon the boy; he only thought of the conspicuousness of the principal character before the on-looking nations; his face lit with the thought, and he said to himself that he wished he could be that child, if it was a tame lion.

Trump, like Aslan, is not a tame lion.  Yet apparently Marco Rubio is warming to the idea of laying down with him.  We hope, at any rate, that Rubio is not the little child who shall lead them.

—Decius

Trumpian Accomplishments, Part I: The End of Big Data

The 74th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in April, 2016.


THIS JOURNAL‘S OCCASIONAL DOUBTS about Trump’s value as a vehicle for Trumpism are not intended to detract from the real accomplishments of Trump’s campaign. First among them has been the precipitous decline and fall of Big Data in political elections. The Trump campaign demonstrates a very simple proposition. The political realm requires personal judgment. Where there is no judgment there is no politics. Where there is no politics there is no judgment.

As recently as 2012 Big Data was said to be the ticket to success in presidential elections. Sasha Issenberg’s Victory Lab heralded the role of analytical social science in remaking the presidential campaign. His September 2012 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal welcomed readers “to the modern science of politics, where voters have become lab rats in an ongoing cycle of controlled trials informed by principles from behavioral psychology.” Campaigns, he enthused, “are now awash in data and insights that allow them to act on that data.” Many further reports, including postelection analysis from Issenberg, documented Big Data efforts to study potential voters.

Hacking voters’ brains, as Issenberg called it, was a particular specialty of the Obama campaign. Crucial to this voter-hacking was that the voter-hackers should adopt the affectations of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, and look somewhat hip but unconcerned, and carry around a MacBook (see Exhibit A below). “Future campaigns ignore the targeting strategy of the Obama campaign of 2012 at their peril,” The New York Times quoted Ken Goldstein as saying.

The “conservative” movement attempted to make quick study, and National Review‘s role in promoting worthless data analytics on the right should not be forgotten. “The task before the GOP now is similar to the one that confronted Democrats a decade ago,” wrote NRO’s media editor in 2014: “to effect a cultural shift within the Republican party, toward what GOP strategist Ruffini calls ‘data-driven decision making’ all the way down the ballot.”

AEI was also quite certain that Big Data would be yuuuuuuuge! “Astronomical feats of data crunching,” Mark Mills wrote in 2012, “are now affordable, enabling new and previously unimaginable services and businesses.” Big Data was Marc Thiessen’s pat explanation of the Romney loss. And AEI has held events on the innovations that could result from applying Big Data techniques in the world of federal statistics.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump had trademarked the slogan “Make America Great Again” in November 2012, without a Republican consultant, National Review writer or data analyst anywhere nearby. While the helpless political science profession writes grant proposals for research in Trump Studies, you can read our results right now. (They’re reading us, too.)

The failure of the Romney campaign’s polling-place analytics was supposed to be motivation for better “investment” in data analytics by Republican campaigns in the future. In the immediate wake of Obama’s 2012 victory, only skeptical leftish essayists warned us to “Beware the Smart Campaign.” “You should be worried,” wrote Zeynep Tufecki, “even if your candidate is—for the moment—better at these methods. Democracy should not just be about how to persuade people to vote for one candidate over another by any means necessary.”

Exhibit A. Advanced data analytics and tactics team BECAUSE SCIENCE!, Obama Campaign, circa 2012.

IN THE CURRENT CYCLE, Ted Cruz’s now-finished campaign spent on invested in Big Data analysis most of all (see Exhibit B). The campaign gave voters and potential volunteers different classifications, from “relaxed leader” to “temperamental conservative” and (eerily) “true believer.” The Washington Post even implausibly suggested that Cruz’s efforts were somehow retro, “a multimillion-dollar bet that such efforts still matter in an age of pop-culture personalities and ­social-media messaging.” A funny thing to say, since microtargeting was at the heart of Facebook-centric “social-media messaging.”

Cruz’s shamelessness in using Big Data extended all the way to his use of the clergy, a fact tending to confirm John Boehner’s judgment on the inner core of the Cruz phenomenon now past. “The campaign’s personality and issues data,” WaPo noted, “was used to determine which pastors to contact for recruitment as county ‘pastor chairs’ for Cruz.”

Exhibit B. Senator Ted Cruz surveys a large data set during his successful 2016 campaign to pimp the GOP Establishment.

After Cruz’s success in Iowa, some Big Data apologists attempted to call the defeat of Trump on the spot. Cruz had slithered his tongue in just the right way for each voter whose ear he had, while Trump had pitched his message to a multitude that did not exist. Trump’s ability to speak his mind to a large number of voters, rather than pretending to be something different to each, was suddenly proof of his evil.

Eliana Johnson, National Review‘s Big Data cheerleader, was right on cue with her endorsement of Cruz’s data savvy—further evidence of his strength in the general election. Eliana, who graduated from NR media editor to Washington editor since her earlier article, breathlessly reported that “statistical awareness permeates the culture of the [Cruz] operation from the candidate to his most junior aides.” And NR devoted an entire article of hers in summer 2015 to Cruz’s statistical prowess.

The campaign with “perhaps the most advanced, or at least the most ambitious” Big Data analysis has now flopped.

TRUMP’S USE OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA has played a role in his success, but not in the way most writers have suggested. The thinkpiece industry is incapable of identifying any political factors behind Trump’s rise. “The only thing that’s really changed between Trump’s other attempts to run for office and now,” says Vanity Fair, “is the advent of social media.” Never mind that the real actors in the social media world are the media companies themselves. Facebook’s laughable denials that it would ever, ever, no never ever seek to influence the 2016 election are contradicted even by The Atlantic.

Since Facebook’s analytical tools won’t be enough to tilt the election, Mark Zuckerberg’s only hope is to use his own media platform as a vehicle for his own anti-Trump campaign. But since the platform he is using was built to negate political action by neutralizing it through the social medium, he cannot win. He cannot be a political actor.

Meanwhile, an early examination of Trump’s website showed that it did not even have the simplest data-collection tools built into it.

Though Jonah Goldberg did throw cold water on the Big Data push, mainstream conservatives’ opposition to Trump is at odds with any doubts they might express about the use of analytics in presidential campaigns. If they conclude that analytics, microtargeting and narrowcasting are corrupting political rhetoric (which they are), then Trump is the only alternative.

Trump’s ability to halt the triumphant conquest of data also shows the particular accomplishments of Trump as a political personalityand separate from the phenomenon of Trumpism. No other candidate expressing the Agenda of American Greatness has sufficient established celebrity to parlay into the bold restoration of American political rhetoric (see Exhibit C) based on immediate personal judgment—a Trumpian accomplishment that JAG will examine later in this series.

Trump disregarded data analytics because he knew that his views genuinely represented what the silent American majority were thinking all along. His instinctive knowledge of the real though often neutralized American polity was the basis of his confidence in ignoring what poorly framed surveys claimed to reveal about the temperament of particular voters.

Trumpian data science exists in spite of the contrasts we’ve outlined between Trump’s approach and the approach Big Data facilitates. The campaign has begun a limited use of data analysis in some circumstances. “The data push,” Politico reported in January, “is focused on integrating information Trump has collected, through his campaign website and at voter rallies, on nontraditional or unregistered supporters.” The campaign’s emphasis on “nontraditional or unregistered supporters” does not serve the same antipolitical end served by Big Data analysis more generally. The core Trumpian message already resonates with those who aren’t surveyed by the usual means. Rather than seeking to neutralize political participants through microanalysis and manipulation of their preferences, Trumpian data analysis simply identifies those who are receptive to Trump’s public, personal political message.

Exhibit C. The Trump data analytics team, media operation and speechwriting studio.

IN ITS DAY, BIG DATA WAS an enemy of political judgment. By taking preference-modeling as its goal it framed politics in terms of economics. It drew the categories of its preference-modeling from psychological science, whose main accomplishment in the past year has been to reveal most of its studies as entirely baseless. Psychologists have no way of including “patriotism” as a term in their analyses, patriotism being a value-laden term. It’s safe to say that “American greatness” was never included either as a motivating independent variable in explaining voter action, nor as a dependent variable in any analysis of the outcomes produced by the American political system.

Because Big Data in politics attempts to psychologize political judgment, it works only to the extent that politics is absent. It is an extension of the managerial science this Journal opposes. And Donald Trump has brought about its demise.

The failure of Big Data proves the existence of the national political phenomenon to which Trump appeals. No politician following the cues of the data sets would have attempted the appeal which Trump decided on in the darkest days of 2012. It required a statesman who knew that the basis of real political deeds, even in 2016, lay in love of real community.

Presented with the option to side with real political rhetoric or leave it for the restoration of data science, conservative leaders have chosen the latter. Those who claim to sympathize with Trumpism but reject its current vehicle are choosing the latter, as well. The opportunity to speak about what matters is now or never.

There, political scientists. A few theses for your grant proposals. Don’t forget to cut us a check. We’ll be too busy paying attention to politics to find out who owes us for their ideas.

—MANLIUS CAPITOLINUS

Trumpian Prudence?

The 71st post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in April, 2016.


Actually, “Trumpian prudence” is a very large question which we don’t have time to explore right now.  But it would be worth examining the Trump campaign through the lens of Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI.  Weekend project, maybe.

In the meantime, read this extraordinary memo from a former Cruz operative explaining why Trump is winning/has won.  (As an aside, we repeat how counterintuitive it is that the neocon flagship and stalwart anti-Trumpite Weekly Standard remains infinitely more interesting than the competition.)

Key paragraphs:

I believe Trump ran a better campaign than Cruz for two reasons:

1)  Republican voters not only wanted an outsider candidate for president, they wanted that candidate to campaign like an outsider

2)  The conventional strategies and tactics on running in the presidential primary had become so stale that an outsider with disdain for professional politics found a new way to win using common sense 

Trump’s simple, straightforward strategy of trying to win in every state, take as much free media as possible, have an inclusion attitude toward getting voters, and appear in front of as many people as possible proved to be sledgehammer against the old way. And unlike just about every other past self-funder, Trump did not let his campaign take him for a ride.

Political professionals have gotten so much power in presidential campaigns that they have diluted the candidates of a message and put up barriers to getting votes. They convince the candidates to run from most media interviews for fear of a gaffe (making them ultimately more gaffe-prone since they get rusty), stick to a boring, limited stump speech to give their talking points more resonance (even though saying something in a new way is more potent), and slice and dice the voters so that virtually everything the candidate says is geared toward an interest group rather than the electorate per se.

Why? Being stage-managed gives more power to the consultants. It makes the candidates more dependent on staff and vendors to navigate them through the torture chamber those people make the election into. The consultants become the smart people and the candidate is a commodity. This attitude is shared by the political media, whose access to the candidates is dependent on sharing a worldview about campaigns with those consultants.

It’s giving Trump too much credit to say that he meant to expose the stupidity of professionalized politics, but that’s what he ended up doing. And he got lucky in the sense that his final primary opponent – although in just about every other way the type voters were looking for in 2016 – was somebody who leaned on that professionalism.

Preach!

The humiliation—the emperor-is-naked exposure—of political consultants is surely one of the most satisfying elements of the 2016 cycle, no matter what the eventual outcome.  For a moment, it appeared that Trump might be assimilated into the consultancy Borg.  Don’t get us wrong; we’re all for Trump professionalizing his delegate-wrangling operation, and if Manafort can accomplish that, great.  Similarly, we’re all for Trump adopting a little discipline.  Not necessarily to the Rubiot extent.  But how about, you know, not directly contradicting his own core policy agenda?

Well, apparently Trump is chafing under the new regime and wants to be Trump again.  We’re somewhat dismayed by the leaks coming out of his camp since the arrival of Manafort.  Until then, the operation had been tight-lipped.  Let’s hope they can get back to that.  Meanwhile here’s to hoping that Trump continues to resist the Borg (resistance in this case definitely NOT futile) and from here on out states his consistent support for the Greatness Agenda.

—Decius

German Beer’s Greatness Agenda

The 70th post from the Journal of American Greatness originally published in April, 2016.


“PURE SWILL,” READS the title of an article in this week’s Economist criticizing the German Reinheitsgebot on its five hundredth anniversary. (Never above spoiling a good celebration, the Economist.) The law protecting the purity of German beer is one of the most successful classic examples of the Greatness Agenda as it was found in the laws protecting the distinctive products of each region. The article? Pure swill indeed.

The arguments that the Economist‘s twentysomething writers recall from their introductory economics courses typically require all “protectionist” economic policies to be framed as ultimately anticompetitive. In a rationally functioning marketplace, every region can produce according to its strengths in order to buy what it needs. From each according to his ability, to each according to his need: was that not a capitalist nostrum?

Whether shiny new iPhones are produced in the U.S. or instead come off perfectly Taylorist factory lines elsewhere in the world hardly matters, according to the Economist. “Designed in California” is enough to make up for the fact that behind the sleek white walls of Apple’s stores flows a river of tears and blood. (The bodily fluids are copyrighted by the Pegatron Corporation, too.)

Since it doesn’t matter where anything is produced or by whom, today’s wizards suggest, it should follow that the notion of terroir is irrational. But appreciation of terroir is too much a class-status signifier to be abandoned that quickly. The appellation d’origine contrôlée has evaded attack, one suspects, because the titans who’ve enjoyed the spoils of outsourcing fill their vacant hours with wine-sampling, cheese courses and developing their sense of style by reading the WSJ “Mansion” section. Everything that they oppose in every other industry they make an exception for in wine, cheese and (excepting at the Economist) beer.

What they defend with their taste and criticize with their lips is, however, one of the most successful ideas of trade protectionism ever devised—and one that (coincidentally) contributed to the advance of civilization through the clarification of national greatness.

DUKES WILHELM IV AND LUDWIG X essentially consecrated their own Greatness Agenda to the preservation of good beer. But we can hardly expect to reestablish any distinctive products, still less their greatness, now that we have permanently idled our factories, and dispersed our supply chains and manufacturing processes through a microrationalization that takes the division of labor to an absurd conclusion.

Following the demands of maximum industrial rationalization has made it progressively more difficult to form companies whose products could even be defended in the way that German beer once was. As the aspects of technological design and production become more widely dispersed, the ability of any corporate leader to grasp the whole of his company becomes ever more difficult. Consultancy veterans know that the process of making recommendations to companies is as much of a black box as the companies themselves. No one can take ownership of a process that has neither end nor means.

The Reinheitsgebot falls exactly outside every category modern economic analysis attempts to supply for it. Being a government-mandated standard to avoid the inclusion of diluents, poisons, rendered animal parts and the like in beer, the Reinheitsgebot was hardly libertarian. Yet it was not aimed at “market-rigging and protectionism” in the pejorative way the Economist frames it.

“By excluding wheat and rye in beer,” the Economist complains, “the law aimed to keep grain prices low for bakers.” According to the usual catechism, all prices should be set by the market, and so this “market-rigging” was presumably bad. Never mind the fact that direct and indirect price-setting pervades the modern economy—from the federal funds rate, to every price connected to the federal funds rate, to every price dependent on the quantity of and velocity of money, to the price of labor. Instead, when we look down on sixteenth-century Germans, we must sneer at their effort to keep grain prices low for bakers and hence for purchasers of bread. The fact that this particular Greatness Agenda succeeded in keeping bread affordable while also setting a standard for beer production that has lasted for half a millennium is apparently to be discounted.

ALL THE ECONOMIST‘S THINKERY CAN REVEAL to us is that “[the] real victim is variety” and that “the purity law has stifled German beer innovation.” This claim is somewhat akin to asserting that Bordeaux’s appellation d’origine contrôlée has stifled the region’s attempt to produce fine Bourgogne. If only Europe were governed by rational economic law, Chablis could be produced in Champagne, and next thing you know the English will be producing porto.

In spite of the supposed irrelevance of product origin, efforts to introduce blind taste testing in the world of food and drink have only been successful on occasions such as the famous “Judgment of Paris.” Normally, people want to know who produced what. That’s why the Trans-Pacific Partnership had to limit country of origin labeling on an array of food products that one should not purchase withoutknowing the country of origin. Otherwise, people might have preferred meat from their own nation to Chinese “variety.” (How this new policy could work with region-eponymous products such as Roquefort is rather less than clear.)

“You can get a whisky and soda at every outpost of the Empire,” Chesterton once wrote, and “that is why so many Empire builders go mad. But you are not tasting or touching any environment, as in the cider of Devonshire or the grapes of the Rhine. You are not approaching Nature in one of her myriad tints of mood, as in the holy act of eating cheese.” The political control of product labeling is only an extension of the political inclination to assertion and definition, of which the bounty of one’s region is a natural part. But today’s economists have strayed so far that even the attempt to defend one’s comparative advantage—the essential contribution of one’s terroir—cannot be justified in political terms.

Though the Economist criticizes the Reinheitsgebot for its threat to product diversity, one scholar has recently noted that “the U.S. three-tier [beer-making] system may be dated in that it constrains small producer growth in favor of maintaining the dominance of the largest brewers…. [Further,] by transplanting the E.U. system, which focuses more on alcohol advertising regulation and public health initiatives, small producer growth may be further encouraged while promoting the safe consumption of alcohol.”

To encourage American greatness through the greatness of its products, we must first have products to produce and the capacity to produce them. But as long as our economists claim they’re sobering us up with their pure swill, we’ll have no choice but to keep toasting the Agenda of American Greatness.

—MANLIUS CAPITOLINUS